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Judges of Color: Examining the Impact of 
Judicial Diversity in the Equal Protection 
Jurisprudence of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
by KRISTINE L. AVENA*
For too many people . . . law is a symbol of exclusion rather than 
empowerment. 
– Former Attorney General of the United States, Eric Holder, 2002 
Introduction 
Article III, section 1 of the Constitution states, “[t]he judicial power of 
the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior 
courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”1  This 
imperative provision of the Constitution establishes the judiciary branch and 
maintains the balance of powers within the federal government.  At a time 
when the executive branch is banning religious minorities from traveling into 
the country2 and stripping children away their parents at the U.S.-Mexico 
border,3 the courts have become the last resort for many during this critical 
period of history.  However, for much of America’s history, the legal system 
has been devoid of the compassion and empathy needed for judges to fully 
*    J.D. Candidate 2019, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; B.A. 2016, 
Chapman University.  A special thank you to Professor Dorit Reiss, my significant other, and the 
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly editors for your invaluable feedback.  I am grateful to the 
fourth Ninth Circuit judges who shared their experiences and knowledge with me.  This Note is 
dedicated to the little girls who dream of becoming a judge one day.
 1.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 2.  Josh Gerstein, Appeals Court Rules Against Trump Travel Ban 3.0, POLITICO (Dec. 22, 
2017), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/12/22/trump-travel-ban-appeal-block-317892.  
 3.  Salvador Rizzo, The Facts About Trump’s Policy of Separating Families at the Border,
WASH. POST (June 19, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2018/06/ 
19/the-facts-about-trumps-policy-of-separating-families-at-the-border/?utm_term=.2524c5c5f7f7.  
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comprehend the impact of their decisions on ordinary people.4  People of 
color, who have historically faced unique experiences because of racial 
discrimination and its legacy, are often victims of this need for empathy.5
Thus, much like the fundamental equality that emanates from a diverse 
Congress,6 the participation of diverse judges in the judiciary is vital to the 
assurance of fairness, legitimacy, and due process in decision-making. 
From slavery to civil rights to affirmative action, America’s history has 
been plagued with the issue of race.  The federal bench is no exception.  For 
almost two centuries, the highest court of the nation did not represent the 
public that it served.  It was not until 191 years after the founding of America 
that the U.S. Supreme Court bench enjoyed the presence of a diverse judge 
with Justice Thurgood Marshall.7  Then in the 1970s, due mainly to President 
Jimmy Carter’s initiative to appoint more minority judges, the racial 
composition of the federal judiciary began to diversify significantly.8
However, while the number of minority judges increased in the past two 
centuries, the federal courts still do not reflect today’s society.  The total 
composition of Article III judges currently includes: 3.4% Asians, 10.6% 
Hispanics, and 14.2% African Americans, compared to 72% Whites.9  This 
composition is still less diverse than the current population of the United 
States, which is 6% Asian, 18% Hispanic, 12% African American, and 61% 
White.10  In fact, a study by political science Professors Rorie Solberg and 
Eric N. Waltenburg reveals that the federal bench is becoming less diverse 
even as the United States is growing more diverse.11
 4.  Jill D. Weinberg & Laura Beth Nielsen, Examining Empathy: Discrimination, 
Experience, and Judicial Decision-making, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 313, 351 (2012). 
 5.  Id. at 326, 350–51. 
 6.  Sheryl Estrada, The 115th Congress Not a Model for Diversity, DIVERSITY INC. (Jan. 4, 
2017), https://www.diversityinc.com/news/115th-congress-not-model-diversity; James Jones, 
Racial Representation: A Solution to Inequality in the People’s House, THE HILL (May 10, 2017), 
http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/civil-rights/332790-racial-representation-a-solution-to-in 
equality-in-the-peoples.  
 7.  DeNeen L. Brown, LBJ’s Shrewd Moves to Make Thurgood Marshall the Nation’s First 
Black Supreme Court Justice, WASH. POST (Oct. 2, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/n 
ews/retropolis/wp/2017/10/02/lbjs-shrewd-moves-to-make-thurgood-marshall-the-nations-first-
black-supreme-court-justice/?utm_term=.44ae6dded661.   
 8. SUSAN B. HAIRE & LAURA P. MOYER, Diversity Matters 3–4 (2015). 
 9.  Goodwin Liu, et al., A Portrait of Asian Americans in the Law 24 (Yale Law School & 
National Asian Pacific American Bar Association 2017), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3 
045905.  
 10.  KAISER FAM. FOUND., KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION ESTIMATES BASED ON THE CENSUS 
BUREAU’S MARCH CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY (CPS: ANNUAL SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC 
SUPPLEMENTS) (2017), https://www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/distribution-by-raceethnicity/. 
 11.  Rorie Solberg & Eric N. Waltenburg, Trump’s Presidency Marks the First Time in 24 
Years That the Federal Bench Is Becoming Less Diverse, THE CONVERSATION (June 11, 2018), 
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Exhibit A. Chart illustrating how previous Presidents have increased judicial 
diversity in the past two decades, but President Trump’s nominees are resulting in 
a less diverse judiciary. 
This Note aims to determine how the presence of minority judges on the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit impacts Equal Protection doctrine.12
The Ninth Circuit, which consists of Alaska, Arizona, California, Guam, Hawaii, 
Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Northern Mariana Islands, Oregon, and Washington,13 is 
the largest and most diverse federal appellate bench in the nation.14  This Note shows 
that a Ninth Circuit judge’s race is important in providing procedural and substantive 
contributions to the federal bench.  Diverse judges use their life experiences to 
ensure that every person is heard and treated fairly, thereby instilling public 
confidence in the legitimacy of the court and educating their colleagues on the panel 
on the unique issues that minority groups encounter.  However, this Note also proves 
that race alone does not influence the court’s equal protection jurisprudence due to 
two major factors: the Ninth Circuit, as an appellate court, is bound by the decisions 
of the U.S. Supreme Court, and judges are committed to their duty to “faithfully and 
impartially” uphold the Constitution.15
https://theconversation.com/trumps-presidency-marks-the-first-time-in-24-years-that-the-federal-
bench-is-becoming-less-diverse-97663; See Exhibit A for judicial diversity chart. 
 12.  For purposes of this study, the terms “minority” and “diverse” judge are used 
interchangeably.
 13.  Map of the Ninth Circuit, https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/content/view.php?pk_id=00000 
00135.
 14.  Russell Wheeler, The Changing Face of the Federal Judiciary, BROOKINGS INST. 1, 4–5 
(Aug. 17, 2009), https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-changing-face-of-the-federal-judiciary/.
 15.  See 28 U.S.C. § 453 (1990) (stating the Judicial Oath “I, _________, do solemnly swear 
(or affirm) that I will administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor 
and to the rich, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties 
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This Note applies the definition of a “minority” from the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).16  According to the EEOC, a minority is “the 
smaller part of a group.”17  These groups consist of: American Indian or Alaskan 
Natives, Asian or Pacific Islanders, Blacks, and Hispanics.18  Currently, there are 11 
racially diverse judges out of 41 judges on the Ninth Circuit: Carlos Tiburcio Bea, 
Consuelo María Callahan, Jerome Farris, Ferdinand F. Fernandez, Mary H. 
Murguia, Jacqueline H. Nguyen, Richard A. Paez, Johnnie B. Rawlinson, A. 
Wallace Tashima, Kim McLane Wardlaw, and Paul J. Watford.19  Approximately 
27% of the 41 judges on this federal appellate bench are diverse, thus comprising of 
three African Americans, two Asians, and six Hispanics.  Individually, these judges 
have unique life experiences that they bring to the bench–Judge Bea faced the threat 
of deportation,20 Judge Nguyen fled her home country as a refugee during the 
Vietnam War,21 and Judge Tashima was interned as a Japanese American during 
World War II.22  This Note addresses the impact that those distinctive life 
experiences bring to the bench. 
Part I of this Note begins by reviewing the impact of race on the equal 
protection doctrine.  Part II provides an overview of past research and methodology, 
and how it differs from this Note.  Next, Part III evaluates and compares personal 
interviews with four Ninth Circuit judges with the outcomes of eight equal 
protection cases regarding criminal, education, voting, and immigration claims.  
Last, Part IV discusses the implications of this study and the benefits of a diverse 
judiciary.
I.  Equal Protection Doctrine 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution states, “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
incumbent upon me as _________ under the Constitution and laws of the United States.  So help 
me God.”). 
 16.  This Note also uses the term “diverse” to describe judges who fall within the EEOC’s 
definition of a racial minority.   
 17.  EEO Terminology, NATIONAL ARCHIVES, https://www.archives.gov/eeo/terminology. 
html. 
 18.  Id.
 19.  See The Judges of this Court in Order of Seniority, UNITED STATES COURTS FOR THE 
NINTH CIRCUIT, https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/content/view_seniority_list.php?pk_id=00000000 
35; A.B.A. STANDING COMMITTEE ON MINORITIES IN THE JUDICIARY, A.B.A. DIRECTORY OF 
MINORITY JUDGES (4th ed. 2008).
 20.  See David Lat, Benchslap of the Day: Say My Name, Say My Name, ABOVE THE LAW
(Feb. 16, 2012, 6:18 PM) https://abovethelaw.com/2012/02/benchslap-of-the-day-say-my-name-
say-my-name/.
 21.  See Casey Tolan, How Jacqueline Nguyen Went From a Vietnamese Refugee to a 
Potential Supreme Court Nominee, SPLINTER NEWS (Feb. 18, 2016, 4:45 PM) https://splinter 
news.com/how-jacqueline-nguyen-went-from-a-vietnamese-refugee-to-1793854865. 
 22.  See Sakura Kato, Judge A. Wallace Tashima: A Judge Who Looks Like Us, DISCOVER
NIKKEI (Aug. 6, 2014) http://www.discovernikkei.org/en/journal/2014/8/6/judge-tashima/.  
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the equal protection of the laws.”23  This study focuses on equal protection because 
it was designed to ensure that the Constitution protects minorities from prejudice in 
the political process.24  The case law encompasses a broad range of civil rights 
issues, including racial discrimination, election law, and criminal justice.  When 
analyzing an equal protection claim, courts apply either a standard of heightened 
scrutiny, which includes both strict scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny, or they apply 
rational basis review.25  Heightened scrutiny applies when a court has reason to 
“suspect” a classification reflects prejudice against a “discrete and insular” minority, 
rather than an informed policy choice.26, 27
There are two situations where one might see the impact of a judge’s race on 
equal protection claims.  First, in order to pass strict scrutiny, a classification must 
be the least discriminatory means or narrowly tailored to serve a compelling 
interest.28  Therefore, although there are prior examples of how the U.S. Supreme 
Court has applied this standard of review, its ambiguous and broad language gives 
judges much flexibility in its application.  Second, if there is a classification that has 
not yet been established by law, judges have the authority to apply specific factors 
to determine whether a group constitutes a “suspect” class before applying strict 
scrutiny.29  Judges have the discretion to assess the following factors: historical and 
current discrimination, political power, immutability of the characteristic, Congress’ 
sensitivity to the classification, and whether the trait correlates to an ability.30  This 
area of undeveloped law is discussed further when comparing the interviews of 
Ninth Circuit judges to how they decided particular cases. 
II.  Background and Methodology 
Past research on judicial decision-making has focused on the impact of a 
variety of factors, but not on the impact of race alone.  There are countless studies 
examining the role of intersectionality or gender on the federal bench,31 decision-
making in state courts or federal circuit courts as a whole,32 and judicial voting 
 23.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  
 24.  U.S. v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
 25.  City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). 
 26.  Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. at 144. 
 27.  Rational basis review, on the other hand, allows a court to uphold a classification as long 
as any rational legislator could think the classification could advance any legitimate purpose. 
 28.  Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1, 377 F.3d 949, 960–61 (9th 
Cir. 2004). 
 29.  Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 440. 
 30.  Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684–88 (1973). 
 31.  See Todd Collins & Laura Moyer, Gender, Race, and Intersectionality on the Federal 
Appellate Bench, 61 POL. RES. Q. 219–27 (2008).  
 32.  See Jonathan P. Kastellec, Panel Composition and Voting on the U.S. Courts of Appeals 
over Time, 64 POL. RES. Q. 377–391 (2011) [hereinafter Kastellec 2011]; see also Jonathan P. 
Kastellec, Racial Diversity and Judicial Influence on Appellate Courts, 57 AM. J. POL. SCI. 167–
83 (2013) [hereinafter Kastellec 2013].  
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patterns in favor or against a plaintiff or defendant.33  These studies have found that 
a judge’s race only has an impact on particular issues.  For example, black judges 
are more sensitive to issues relating to racial discrimination because of their racial 
identity and firsthand experiences with racial discrimination.34  In addition, Latino 
judges are more sympathetic in immigration cases not due to racial discrimination, 
but rather to “the shared view of opportunities that life in the United States presented 
to their immigrant families.”35  Similarly, Asian judges are also more sympathetic 
to immigrants because of their firsthand experiences with racism and xenophobia.36
Among others, one consistent result is that minority judges are more sympathetic to 
civil rights issues such as gender and racial discrimination.37
This Note differs from prior studies because it focuses specifically on the Ninth 
Circuit and includes the added benefit of four interviews to the case analysis.  This 
Note is limited to the Ninth Circuit because of its substantial diversity and size 
compared to the other ten federal circuits.  It differs from previous studies in that it 
is not restricted to one race alone, but rather all groups of racial minorities according 
to the EEOC.  Although people of different racial backgrounds may have different 
experiences, racial discrimination is one common thread that is unique to identifying 
with a minority group. 
The theory underlying this analysis is substantive representation, which posits 
that “when circumstances and discretion allow, public officials will act to benefit 
members of groups of which they are a part.”38  A limitation of this theory with 
respect to appellate judges is that they are unelected and accorded life tenure, so they 
are not easily affected by public opinion.39  Therefore, while this political insulation 
may lead some to do more to benefit their group, others may hide behind such 
safeguards and maintain the status quo.  Additionally, Supreme Court scholars 
Harold Spaeth and Jeffrey Segal’s attitudinal model connects with this study’s focus 
on judicial decision-making.  The attitudinal model claims that judges decide cases 
based on personal ideology rather than adherence to the law.40  However, a major 
limitation of the attitudinal model is its assumption that ideology and legal 
interpretation are mutually exclusive in judicial decision-making.  Thus, merely 
 33.  See Jeff Yates, ‘For the Times They Are A-Changin’: Explaining Voting Patterns of U.S. 
Supreme Court Justices through Identification of Micro-Publics, 28 BYU J. OF PUB. L. 117–143 
(2013).
 34.  HAIRE & MOYER, supra note 8, at 18–22. 
 35.  Id. at 25. 
 36.  Josh Hsu, Asian American Judges: Identity, Their Narratives, & Diversity on the Bench,
11 ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 92, 106, 112 (2006).  
 37.  Sean Farhang & Gregory Wawro, Institutional Dynamics on the U.S. Court of Appeals: 
Minority Representation Under Panel Decision Making, J.L. ECON. & ORG. 303 (2004). 
 38.  Collins & Moyer, supra note 31, at 220. 
 39.  Kastellec 2013, supra note 32, at 168–69.   
 40.  Howard Gilman, What’s Law Got to Do With It? Judicial Behavioralists Test the Legal 
Model of Judicial Decision Making, 26 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 465, 467 (2001). 
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because a judge’s ideology impacts one’s decision does not mean that their ideology 
conflicts with the law. 
This research focuses on whether Ninth Circuit judges fit into these theoretical 
models by examining their personal testimony, statements, and written opinions.  It 
derives its findings from two main sources: personal interviews and published 
opinions.  Over the course of three months, I conducted interviews with four diverse 
Ninth Circuit judges.  I also evaluated Ninth Circuit equal protection jurisprudence, 
which consists of thirty cases written by minority judges.  This case law supplements 
these interviews by connecting the judges’ testimony to their written opinions and 
dissents. 
III.  Findings 
A.  Testimony from Personal Interviews and Questionnaires 
A substantial component of this study incorporates interviews with Ninth 
Circuit judges.  Despite the apparent limitations of personal interviews, the judges’ 
insight is valuable in discerning the impact of race on their decision-making.  I 
conducted interviews in person and telephonically, which lasted between 30 minutes 
to one hour.  The interviews adhered to a specific structure.  First, I informed the 
judges of my topic and granted anonymity if they desired.  Second, I asked questions 
about their methods of persuasion and judicial decision-making.  Third, we 
discussed the Ninth Circuit’s equal protection jurisprudence, with a particular focus 
on the opinions and dissents they have written.  Fourth, I inquired about the judges’ 
specific life experiences and diversity on the federal bench.
1.  Institutional Impact as a Federal Appellate Court 
Appellate court decision-making is distinguishable from trial court 
decision-making due to the institutional structure of the three-judge panel.41  Thus, 
it would be a disservice to discount the institutional dynamics of panels when 
evaluating the impact of race on decision-making.  Research has consistently shown 
that appellate judges are more receptive to the preferences of the other members on 
the panel.42  As such, the role of minority judges in these small panel sizes 
encourages impartiality “by ensuring that a single set of values or views do not 
dominate judicial decision-making.”43  In addition, federal appellate court decisions 
are almost always unanimous.44  Thus, due to the small size of the group, an 
atmosphere of collegiality, and panel unanimity, the role of minority judges in the 
 41.  See generally Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, Ninth Circuit Rules, Circuit 
Advisory Committee Notes. 
 42.  HAIRE & MOYER, supra note 8 at 88. 
 43.  Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Racial Diversity on the Bench: Beyond Role Models and Public 
Confidence, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 405, 411 (2000). 
 44.  Farhang & Wawro, supra note 37. 
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Ninth Circuit can be a particularly vital one due to a greater potential to influence 
other nonminority judges on the panel. 
When meeting with the Ninth Circuit judges individually, I asked, “[w]hat 
methods do you use in persuading your colleagues on the panel when there are 
disagreements?”  One judge stressed the importance of being knowledgeable about 
her colleagues in order to persuade them more effectively.45  For instance, it was 
helpful to know what they have written, published, and were interested in.  Another 
judge adopted a more formalistic approach and described how he used a “method of 
analysis” when persuading his colleagues.46  A third judge noted that the panels try 
to reach “consensus whenever possible” when they confer.47  Finally, one judge 
emphasized that interrelationships are important, but ultimately it comes down to 
the issues.48  An interesting commonality I found amongst the judges was the respect 
they shared for one another.  Despite the disagreements amongst the judges in terms 
of interpreting the law, their interactions illustrate the collegiality and impartiality 
within the Ninth Circuit. 
2.  Impact of Party Affiliation on Judges’ View of Their Judicial Role 
Diversity on the bench can be extremely partisan between Republicans and 
Democrats.  Although the Constitution permits the President to appoint and the 
Senate to confirm federal judges,49 politics influences the choices for the federal 
bench.50  This delicate intersection between the law, judicial activism, and political 
affiliation is significant because it can mean the difference between a confirmation 
or no confirmation.51
After interviewing two Ninth Circuit judges who were appointed by 
Republican Presidents and two judges who were appointed by Democratic 
Presidents, I found that judges of each party stressed the importance of remaining 
impartial in order to apply the law faithfully.  However, I also noticed that party 
affiliations influenced these judges’ ideas about what it meant to “apply the law 
faithfully.”52  Specifically, Republican-appointed judges seemed to view the judicial 
branch as an extension of the executive and legislative branches and emphasized the 
 45.  Telephone Interview with Judge Consuelo M. Callahan, Ninth Circuit Judge (Nov. 7, 
2017).
 46.  Confidential Interview with Ninth Circuit Judge, in San Francisco, Calif. (Oct. 17, 2017). 
 47.  Interview with Judge Mary H. Murguia, Ninth Circuit Judge, in San Francisco, Calif. 
(Nov. 15, 2017). 
 48.  Telephone Interview with Judge Jacqueline H. Nguyen, Ninth Circuit Judge (Dec. 5, 
2017).
 49.  See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 50.  Opinion, Judges Shouldn’t Be Partisan Punching Bags, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2018, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/08/opinion/judicial-independence.html. 
 51.  See Carl Hulse, G.O.P. Blocks Judicial Nominee in a Sign of Battles to Come, N.Y. TIMES
(May 19, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/20/us/politics/20congress.html.  
 52.  See 28 U.S.C. § 453 (1990). 
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importance of judicial deference to those branches accordingly.53  In contrast, 
Democratic-appointed judges expressed that they were more likely to view the other 
branches’ actions critically and emphasized their roles as public servants, not as 
guardians of the determinations of the other branches.  However, I offer these 
conclusions with skepticism due to the extremely small sample size of four judges. 
Furthermore, I found that despite the adverse backgrounds of particular diverse 
Ninth Circuit judges, they were committed to applying facts to the law rather than 
advocating for their idea of justice.  For instance, Judge Nguyen, who came to the 
U.S. as a refugee from the Vietnam War, stated that her obligation is to “faithfully 
apply the law regardless of who the litigants are, which includes rich or poor, men 
or women, and people of any ethnic origin or nationality.”54  Additionally, Judge 
Murguia, who grew up in Kansas with six siblings, had a low socioeconomic status, 
and was raised by Mexican immigrants, admitted that the hardest thing she does as 
a judge is rule contrary to her personal opinions.55  She highlighted the necessity of 
separating her personal viewpoints from the law when reaching a decision and 
reiterated her judicial responsibilities according to the oath she took under the 
Constitution.56
Judge Murguia’s experiences prior to joining the Ninth Circuit bench are 
noteworthy because she excused herself from the Melendres v. Arpaio case when 
she served as a U.S. District Court judge in 2009.57  She faced much pressure to 
recuse herself from the case because her twin sister is the head of the largest Hispanic 
civil rights organization in the nation, National Council of La Raza, and made 
disparaging remarks against Sheriff Joe Arpaio.  In “an abundance of caution,”58
Judge Murguia decided to uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary to 
the public.59  Judge Murguia’s actions prove that some judges actively strive to 
separate their personal connections from their decisions.  Even with politically 
charged issues such as Sheriff Arapio’s practice of racially profiling Latinos, Judge 
Murguia’s ability to maintain an impartial stance is significant due to her extremely 
disadvantageous background.  As the daughter of Latino immigrants who grew up 
 53.  But see City and County of San Francisco v. Trump, 9th Cir., Aug. 1, 2018, No. 17-17478 
(2018) WL 3637911 (two Democratic-appointed nonminority judges holding that executive branch 
may not withhold federal grants from sanctuary cities without congressional authorization and the 
sole Republican-appointed minority judge dissenting that the case is not ripe for review). 
 54.  Telephone Interview with Judge Jacqueline H. Nguyen, supra note 48. 
 55.  Interview with Judge Mary H. Murguia, supra note 47. 
 56.  Id.
 57.  Stephen Lemons, Joe Arpaio Scores: Judge Mary Murguia Recuses Self from Racial 
Profiling Lawsuit Against Joe Arpaio, PHX. NEW TIMES (July 16, 2009), http://www.phoenix 
newtimes.com/news/joe-arpaio-scores-judge-mary-murguia-recuses-self-from-racial-profiling-
lawsuit-against-joe-arpaio-6498674. 
 58.  Interview with Judge Mary H. Murguia, supra note 47. 
 59.  See CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES, Canons 1 and 2 (Mar. 20, 2014), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/code-conduct-united-states-judges#b.  
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poor,60 she likely connected with the plaintiffs in this case.  This impartiality is even 
more impressive because she decided to recuse herself from a position where she 
could have potentially corrected a wrong.61  Thus, Judge Murguia contradicts both 
the substantive representation and attitudinal models because she values her judicial 
role more than her personal ideology. 
Another remarkable judge is Judge Tashima, a 1996 Clinton appointee.62
Given his personal experience of living in an internment camp during World War 
II,63 Judge Tashima acknowledged the impact that his racial identity and historical 
mistreatment have made on his decision-making.64  In a journal article describing 
his experience in a Japanese American internment camp, Judge Tashima wrote: 
Because we are all creatures of our past, I have no doubt that my life 
experiences, including the evacuation and internment, have shaped 
the way I view my job as a federal judge and the skepticism that I 
sometimes bring to the representations and motives of the other 
branches of government.65
This critical eye to government action is further evidenced by Judge Tashima’s 
opinions on equal protection claims.  For instance, he has criticized the 
government’s race-based actions “in the name of science and medicine.”66  He has 
also written a significant number of equal protection opinions since being appointed, 
compared to his Ninth Circuit colleagues.  Judge Tashima’s political beliefs and 
strong connection to his racial identity represent a telling example of how a minority 
judge’s experiences have informed his decision-making. 
3.  Impact of Race on Judicial Decision-Making 
When asked, “[w]hat role, if any, do you think your ethnic background plays 
in your decision making,” several of the judges became defensive.  One judge went 
so far as to say, “race is irrelevant” to the benefit versus burden analysis in equal 
protection.67  Another judge stressed that she is not “agenda-driven,” and judges 
work hard to be impartial.68  Nevertheless, both judges acknowledged that race does 
have an impact in particular situations.  One judge admitted that judges who have 
had experiences with police officers or the criminal justice system “cannot help but 
 60.  Manny Lopez, Raising the Bar, KAN. CITY BUS. J. (Feb. 11, 2001), https://www.bizjo 
urnals.com/kansascity/stories/2001/02/12/focus1.html. 
 61.  Lemons, supra note 57. 
 62.  See The Judges of this Court in Order of Seniority, supra note 19. 
 63.  Kato, supra note 22. 
 64.  A. Wallace Tashima, Play It Again, Uncle Sam, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 8 (2005). 
 65.  Id.
 66.  Mitchell v. Washington, 818 F.3d 436, 444 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 67.  Confidential Interview with Ninth Circuit Judge, in San Francisco, Calif. (Oct. 17, 2017). 
 68.  Telephone Interview with Judge Consuelo M. Callahan, supra note 45. 
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be influenced by where they come from.”69  Furthermore, a judge stated that “the 
door might easily open to believing a minority discrimination claimant by a member 
of that same minority,” and that it is a “human fallibility.”70  Finally, another judge 
noted that her unique experiences have “given her more context” and allowed her to 
see the law in a different lens, but she is uncertain that this perspective has affected 
her decision-making.71
These observations reinforce some scholars’ reluctance to interview judges 
because, at times, these direct questions will place them in a tense position between 
appearing as an objective interpreter of the law72 and advocating for their perception 
of justice.  Because of this cognitive dissonance, judges may make statements that 
do not reflect their actions even without intentionally lying.  In fact, two leading 
scholars on the Supreme Court explained that “asking judges whether their attitudes 
reflect policy preferences or opinions about the law would not be very useful.  ‘Self-
deception, social desirability effects, and flat-out lying would mar any such 
analysis.’”73
However, regardless of the political insulation that Article III judges enjoy, 
they are inevitably placed in a political position.  As federal judges, they must be 
conscious of their role within the federal government, the polarized nature of 
political parties, and the political ramifications of their decisions.  This objective to 
be impartial and committed to precedent is further illustrated in judicial confirmation 
hearings, where the Senate carefully scrutinizes the past statements and actions of 
judicial appointees.74  Therefore, at times, federal judges are forced to adopt a 
formalistic position that disregards the role that their personal background plays in 
their thought processes. 
Furthermore, judges’ reluctance to consider the impact that their diverse life 
experiences might have on their decisions can be attributed, at least in part, to the 
position of the federal appellate court in comparison to the U.S. Supreme Court.  
Hierarchically, the Ninth Circuit is positioned below the U.S. Supreme Court, so 
Ninth Circuit judges have a natural tendency to refrain from exhibiting any 
disagreement or discontent about the precedents set forth by the highest court of the 
nation.  Unsurprisingly, every judge I interviewed stressed that they must abide by 
the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Likewise, the Ninth Circuit is also placed in a unique position compared to the 
federal district courts.  For example, in immigration cases, the Ninth Circuit reviews 
cases from the immigration court and Board of Immigration Appeals with a 
 69.  Telephone Interview with Judge Consuelo M. Callahan, supra note 45.
 70.  Confidential Interview with Ninth Circuit Judge, in San Francisco, Calif. (Oct. 17, 2017). 
 71.  Interview with Judge Mary H. Murguia, supra note 47. 
 72.  See CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES, supra note 59, at Canon 2. 
 73.  Gilman, supra note 40, at 476.  
 74.  See S. COMM ON THE JUDICIARY, 106TH CONG. RESPONSES OF MARY H. MURGUIA 
NOMINEE TO BE U.S. CIRCUIT JUDGE FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT TO THE WRITTEN QUESTIONS OF 
SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS, https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/MaryMurguia-
QFRs.pdf. [hereinafter RESPONSES OF MARY H. MURGUIA NOMINEE].
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deferential standard of review.  This illustration of respectful deference was present 
in all of the interviews I conducted with Ninth Circuit judges and exemplifies the 
constraints that limit appellate court judges in their decision-making.  Therefore, 
Ninth Circuit judges must accord proper deference not only to the U.S. Supreme 
Court but also to the fact-finding responsibilities of the federal district courts.  This 
unique position greatly inhibits federal appellate judges from exercising their 
discretion. 
Despite judges’ adherence to impartiality and precedent, a common thread 
among the interviewed judges was the value they placed on professional 
experiences, education, and overcoming adversity in helping them obtain their 
prestigious post.  For instance, Judge Callahan, who is the first lawyer in her family, 
highlighted that “education is the great equalizer.”75  Moreover, Judge Murguia 
expressed a sense of triumph when describing how the American dream came true 
for her and her siblings.76  She reiterated this pride during her confirmation hearings 
to become a Ninth Circuit judge and wrote, “your intellect and your character 
contribute in defining who you are, but I also think that your heritage and your 
culture is key, and that’s what makes the person who is the judge.”77
Finally, Judge Nguyen highlighted that even though she feels a “special 
responsibility” as the first Asian American judge to serve in a federal appellate court, 
she stressed that this responsibility does not “translate into bending or shaping the 
law in favor of any group.”78  However, she did express that she takes her 
responsibility seriously in “being a role model, mentor, accessible to the 
community” and “maintaining equal opportunities and professional advancement for 
individuals who have been disadvantaged in the past.”79  Therefore, while the judges 
were uncertain about the effect that race plays in their thought processes, their 
responses highlight the connection they feel to overcoming substantial obstacles 
while growing up.  This powerful connection to their self-worth is a significant and 
unique aspect of who they are as judges of color in one of the highest courts in the 
nation. 
B.  Case Law 
To discern the influence that minority judges play in equal protection 
jurisprudence, I employed a matching method.  This statistical technique compares 
minority and nonminority panels by determining if there is a difference between four 
panels with two or more minority judges and four panels of three nonminority 
judges.  The eight cases were selected at random by utilizing a legal research 
database and filtering the proper jurisdiction, legal issue, and judges.  I supplemented 
 75.  Telephone Interview with Judge Consuelo M. Callahan, supra note 45. 
 76.  Judge Murguia, Video Oral History with Ninth Judicial Circuit Historical Society, (July 
7, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CMX1wvtfgoM. 
 77.  RESPONSES OF MARY H. MURGUIA NOMINEE, supra note 74. 
 78.  Telephone Interview with Judge Jacqueline H. Nguyen, supra note 48. 
 79.  Id.
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the matching method by examining particular opinions, dissents, and statements 
from minority judges during oral arguments. 
1.  Institutional Impact as a Federal Appellate Court 
Deference to the U.S. Supreme Court was also apparent in case law that 
includes panels of minority judges.  For example, in Latta v. Otter, both Judge 
Rawlinson and Judge Bea dissented from the denial of rehearing en banc for a same-
sex marriage claim.  In a dissent written by Judge O’Scannlain, a nonminority judge, 
and joined by Judge Rawlinson and Judge Bea, they wrote, “[w]e are a Court of 
Appeals, not the Supreme Court, and our obligation is to adhere to” the Supreme 
Court’s views.80  The dissent continued to criticize their Ninth Circuit colleagues by 
arguing, “[t]he panel’s opinion . . . disregards binding Supreme Court precedent, 
intrudes on democratic self-governance, and undermines our Constitution’s 
commitment to federalism.”81  These sentiments highlight the value that appellate 
judges place on their responsibility to apply precedent.  Rather than engaging in 
policymaking, the Latta dissent makes clear that specific Ninth Circuit judges are 
cognizant of the separation of powers established by the Constitution. 
 80.  Latta v. Otter, 779 F.3d 902, 907 (9th Cir. 2015) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting). 
 81.  Id. at 914. 
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2.  Using a Matching Method to Analyze the Connection Between 
Equal Protection Jurisprudence and Judicial Racial Diversity 
Nonminority Panels
(3 nonminority judges) 
Minority Panels  
(2+ minority judges) 
Harrington v. Scribner,
785 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 2015) 
(Thomas, O’Scannlain, Mckeown) 
Byrd v. Maricopa County Sheriff’s 
Dept., 565 F.3d 1205 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(Minority: Fernandez, Callahan)  
(Nonminority: Ikuta) 
Johnson v. State of Cal.,
207 F.3d 650 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(Fletcher, Nelson, Brunetti) 
A.C.L.U. of Nevada v. City of Las 
Vegas,
466 F.3d 784 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(Minority: Paez, Tashima)  
(Nonminority: Thomas) 
Coalition for Economic Equity v. 
Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 703 (9th Cir. 
1997)  
(O’Scannlain, Leavy Kleinfeld) 
Parents Involved in Community 
Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1,
426 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2005)  
(Minority: Bea, Dissent; Callahan 
joins Dissent; Rawlinson concurring 
in opinion)  
(Nonminority: Schroeder, Pregerson, 
Kozinski, Kleinfeld, Hawkins, 
Fletcher, Fisher, Tallman)  
Garza v. County of Los Angeles,
918 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1990) 
(Schroeder, Nelson, Kozinski) 
U.S. v. Navarro,
800 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2015)
(Minority: Tashima Opinion, Callahan 
also on panel)  
(Nonminority: Reinhardt) 
i.  Racial Discrimination in Criminal Claims 
A diverse panel does not necessarily guarantee the success of a criminal 
defendant.  In United States v. Navarro, a panel which included Judge Tashima and 
Judge Callahan ruled against the defendant.  The panel held that the government met 
the lowest standard of review, rational basis, in delaying the implementation of a 
sentencing guideline amendment for one year.82  Additionally, in Byrd v. Maricopa 
County Sheriff’s Dept., the panel consisted of two minority judges, Judge Fernandez 
and Judge Callahan.  The panel held that a strip search by a female officer did not 
 82.  U.S. v. Navarro, 800 F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th Cir. 2015). 
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violate a prisoner’s equal protection rights.83  The court reasoned that the inmate 
“‘failed to allege that defendants’ acts or omissions were motivated by 
discriminatory animus toward’ male prisoners.”84  These cases are interesting 
examples because they consisted of panels of two minority judges who voted against 
a criminal defendant.  Although in Navarro, the minority panel provided a clearer 
precedent to follow, Byrd was more vague in determining whether a law 
enforcement official genuinely had a discriminatory motive.  Thus, Navarro and
Byrd suggest that minority identity does not improperly influence the law, even in 
racial discrimination claims. 
On the same note, a Ninth Circuit panel decided that police officers violated a 
Korean victim’s right to equal protection after they failed to investigate her 
perpetrator’s sobriety or charge him with a DUI.  Judge Callahan, being the only 
minority judge on the panel, wrote a separate partial dissenting opinion.85  She 
highlighted the deference that must be given to police officers regarding the manner 
and time in which they conduct their investigations and expressed concern over the 
majority’s broad language.86  Judge Callahan’s dissenting opinion contradicts the 
notion that minority judges are more sympathetic to criminal defendants.87
Although her desire to give officers deference may likely be attributable to her 
extensive professional experience as a district attorney,88 her desire to differentiate 
herself from her nonminority colleagues supports the conclusion that race is not a 
determinative factor in criminal justice equal protection claims. 
In contrast, full nonminority panels have ruled in favor of criminal defendants.  
In Johnson v. State of California, an all-White panel held that a prison inmate’s 
allegation regarding racial discrimination in prison housing was sufficient to bring a 
claim under the Equal Protection Clause.89  The criminal defendant was successful 
in alleging the wardens’ awareness of race-based housing and how the policy failed 
to advance any penological purpose.90  Furthermore, in Harrington v. Scribner, a 
full panel of nonminority appellate court judges sought to protect a prison inmate’s 
rights in his jury instructions.91  The nonminority panel held that the inmate’s jury 
instructions erroneously applied too much deference to state actors.92  They stressed 
that “racial classifications in prisons are ‘immediately suspect’ and subject to strict 
 83.  Byrd v. Maricopa County Sheriff’s Dept., 565 F.3d 1205, 1212 (9th Cir. 2009), on reh’g 
en banc, 629 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 84.  Id. at 1212.  
 85.  Elliot-Park v. Manglona, 592 F.3d 1003, 1009 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 86.  Id.
 87.  HAIRE & MOYER, supra note 8, at 18–22. 
 88.  Biography of Callahan, Consuelo Maria, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, https://www.fjc.go 
v/history/judges/callahan-consuelo-maria.
 89.  Johnson v. State of Cal., 207 F.3d 650, 655 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 90.  Id.
 91.  Harrington v. Scribner, 785 F.3d 1299, 1306 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 92.  Id.
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scrutiny.”93 Johnson and Harrington illustrate how nonminority panels have 
protected the rights of prison inmates in egregious cases.  Therefore, these cases 
prove that, on the surface, a judge’s race does not seem to play a role in equal 
protection criminal claims. 
ii.  Racial Discrimination in Education Claims 
Judicial diversity with respect to equal protection claims in education also 
prove inconclusive.  In 2005, the Ninth Circuit heard Parents Involved in Community 
Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1 en banc.94  While one minority judge, Judge 
Rawlinson, joined the majority opinion, two minority judges, Judge Bea and Judge 
Callahan, dissented from the majority opinion.  The Court held that a school district 
did not engage in racial balancing when they employed a race-based tiebreaker in 
assigning students to public high schools.95  Judge Bea’s and Judge Callahan’s 
statements during the interviews were consistent with their dissenting opinion.  
During their interviews, they stressed that their responsibility is to apply the law 
objectively without favoring one racial group over another.96  Their dissent 
illustrates their conviction to faithfully apply the law even in controversial 
circumstances.  Furthermore, their actions contradict the substantive representation 
model because their interpretation of the law transcended beyond their racial 
identity.
iii.  Racial Discrimination in Voting and Public Accommodation 
Claims
There are minimal differences between nonminority and minority panels in 
voting and public accommodation equal protection cases.  First, in Garza v. County 
of Los Angeles, a nonminority panel ruled in favor of Hispanic plaintiffs.97  This 
nonminority panel held that the redrawing of certain districts in Los Angeles 
constituted intentional discrimination against Hispanic voters.98  In contrast, Judge 
Bea wrote the opinion for Feldman v. Arizona Secretary of State’s Office, which 
upheld the constitutionality of an Arizona law which disparately impacted minority 
voters.99  While Judge Bea did express concern over whether the law imposed a 
significant or minor burden on minority voters during the case’s oral argument, he 
 93.  Harrington, 785 F.3d at 1306.
 94.  Parents Involved in Comty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162, 1166, 1184 
(9th Cir. 2005), rev’d and remanded, 551 U.S. 701, 127 S.Ct. 2738 (2007), vacated, 498 F.3d 1059 
(9th Cir. 2007). 
 95.  Id.
 96.  Telephone Interview with Judge Consuelo M. Callahan, supra note 45; Confidential 
Interview with Ninth Circuit Judge, in San Francisco, Calif. (Oct. 17, 2017). 
 97.  Garza v. Cty. of L.A., 918 F.2d 763, 769 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 98.  Id.
 99.  Feldman v. Ariz. Sec’y of State’s Office, 842 F.3d 613, 628 (9th Cir. 2016), reh’g en 
banc granted, 840 F.3d 1164 (9th Cir. 2016). 
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ultimately decided that the impact on racial minorities was only disparate, or 
incidental.100  In fact, Chief Judge Thomas, a nonminority judge, wrote a dissent 
arguing that the law imposes a substantial burden on minority voters and thus 
requires a stricter standard of review.101  These two cases challenge the assumption 
that diverse judges tend to side with minority litigants when deciding their cases. 
On the other hand, equal protection claims in public accommodations have 
slightly aligned with conclusions from prior studies regarding diverse judges’ 
sympathy towards minority groups.  For example, in Coalition for Economic Equity 
v. Wilson, a full nonminority panel held that California Proposition 209, which 
prohibited gender and racial discrimination in public programs, was 
constitutional.102  However, a panel consisting of minority Judge Paez and Judge 
Tashima held that a tabling ordinance, which prohibited solicitation in certain areas 
in Las Vegas, violated the American Civil Liberty Union’s Equal Protection rights 
in A.C.L.U. of Nevada v. City of Las Vegas.103  Thus, equal protection claims in 
voting and public accommodation cases have been inconsistent and do not provide 
much insight in discerning how a judge’s race may impact their decisions. 
iv.  Racial Discrimination in Immigration Claims 
Although not part of the matching method analysis, I conclude the case law 
analysis with a discussion a few of Judge Nguyen’s and Judge Bea’s opinions in 
immigration claims due to their unique personal experiences with immigration into 
the United States.  During my interview with Judge Nguyen, she admitted to having 
personal viewpoints regarding how open the U.S. should be to immigrants that stem 
from her experience of fleeing her home country as a refugee during the Vietnam 
War.104  In fact, she has even written an op-ed detailing her views on the important 
role that immigrants play in U.S. society: 
Like my family, many immigrants view America from a unique 
vantage point . . . those who personally faced hardships like war, 
poverty, and persecution bring a fresh and powerful appreciation of 
America’s ideals of liberty and justice.                    105   
However, in Valencia v. Lynch, she denied a Mexican immigrant’s petition for 
a labor certification and deferred to the Attorney General’s interpretation of the 
 100.  Oral Argument at 38:28, Feldman v. Ariz. Sec’y of State’s Office, 842 F.3d 613 (9th Cir. 
2016) (No. 16-16698), https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view_video.php?pk_vid=0000010385.
 101.  Feldman, 842 F.3d 613 (Thomas, C.J., dissenting). 
 102.  Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 701 (9th Cir. 1997), as amended on 
denial of reh’g and reh’g en banc, (Aug. 21, 1997), as amended, (Aug. 26, 1997). 
 103.  A.C.L.U. of Nevada v. City of Las Vegas, 466 F.3d 784, 800 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 104.  Telephone Interview with Judge Jacqueline H. Nguyen, supra note 48. 
 105.  Tolan, supra note 21. 
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immigration statute instead.106  While this decision may contradict Judge Nguyen’s 
personal viewpoints, it is consistent with her statements during the interview.  She 
emphasized her obligation as a federal appellate court judge to apply the proper level 
of deference to the immigration courts and officials, even if doing so would 
challenge her personal beliefs about immigration.107  Judge Nguyen’s ability to 
separate her opinions from the law is even more noteworthy, considering the severe 
hardships she had to overcome as a refugee. 
Likewise, Judge Bea faced immigration conflicts when he was a law student 
at Stanford.108  He had been ordered deported by the Hearing Officer, who is the 
equivalent of an Immigration Judge today.  Luckily, the chairman of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals was a fan of Judge Bea’s basketball skills, reversed the order, 
and reinstated his resident visa.109  In an address to the Board of Immigration 
Appeals and Immigration Judges, Judge Bea remarked, “[e]very immigrant has a 
story.  You see before you an immigrant who was once under an order of 
deportation.”110  Thus, one would assume that Judge Bea’s experience of almost 
being deported would make him more likely to rule in favor of deportees who seek 
relief, but that does not seem to be the case.  In Young Sun Shin v. Mukasey, Judge 
Bea denied an alien’s petition for review of her removal order because she 
overstayed her visitor’s visa and obtained a fraudulent green card.111  Furthermore, 
in U.S. v. Arizona, Judge Bea concurred in part and dissented in part to the majority’s 
invalidation of Arizona’s controversial S.B. 1070.112  He ruled that section 2, which 
allows local officers to stop a person if they have probable cause that the person may 
be deportable, and section 6, which “effect[s] warrantless arrests based on probable 
cause of removability,”113 should not be preempted by federal law.114  Therefore, 
despite Judge Bea’s ability to empathize with immigrant litigants, his immigrant 
experience has informed and enriched his understanding of immigration law. 
Judge Nguyen and Judge Bea’s decisions challenge prior studies’ findings that 
minority judges are more likely to grant relief to immigrant litigants.  Although these 
 106.  Valencia v. Lynch, 811 F.3d 1211, 1213 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 107.  Telephone Interview with Judge Jacqueline H. Nguyen, supra note 48. 
 108.  Terry Nagel, U.S. Court of Appeals Judge Carlos Bea to Focus on Religion in 
Constitution Day Lecture on Monday, STANFORD LAW SCHOOL PRESS (Sept. 12, 2014), https://law 
stanford.edu/press/u-s-court-of-appeals-judge-carlos-bea-to-focus-on-religion-in-constitution-day
-lecture-on-monday/.
 109.  Id.
 110.  Address by the Honorable Carlos T. Bea Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit to the Board of Immigration Appeals and Immigration Judges (Aug. 10, 2007), (transcript 
available at http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/files/bea_address_to_ bia_and_ij_2007 
_annual_convention.pdf).  
 111.  Young Sun Shin v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 1019, 1022 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 112.  U.S. v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 369 (9th Cir. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and 
remanded, 567 U.S. 387, 132 S.Ct. 2492 (2012). 
 113.  Id. at 361. 
 114.  Id. at 391. 
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decisions may be the product of participating in a mixed panel of three judges or 
detaching their personal experiences as immigrants from the law, Judge Nguyen’s 
and Judge Bea’s opinions contradict the Spaeth and Segel attitudinal model.  Despite 
their strong connections to the plight of immigrants, they can still apply the law 
objectively without sticking to their personal proclivities.  Consequently, the Ninth 
Circuit’s equal protection jurisprudence suggests that judges of color have an 
extraordinary ability to encourage impartiality and thus, enrich the judiciary, by 
utilizing their racial perspectives to inform the court’s decisions.115
IV.  Discussion 
A.  Common Themes 
Despite the inherent tension of discussing race as a federal judge, some themes 
are present in my research.  First, the judges exhibited a willingness and excitement 
to speak about the impact of their professional and life experiences on their career, 
but not on their decision-making.  From being the first in their family to become an 
attorney to competing as a basketball player in the Olympics, these judges were 
eager to share their ability to overcome adversity.  As judges of color, they 
understandably displayed a sense of pride in excelling in their career despite the 
obstacles that minorities encounter within the legal profession. 
Second, while judges did not explicitly discuss the impact of race in their 
decision-making, they implied that having a diverse bench positively impacts equal 
protection doctrine in specific situations.  When asked, “[i]n which way, if any, do 
you think the presence of minority judges improves the court’s equal protection 
jurisprudence,” the Ninth Circuit judges mainly alluded to cases involving racial 
discrimination and criminal justice.  For example, one judge noted that he would 
take race into account when it was “prudent[ial]” to do so.116  He provided an 
example of having an informant of the same race as a gang member in an FBI 
investigation in order to serve a compelling government interest.117  Moreover, 
Judge Callahan highlighted the benefit of having diverse judges when analyzing 
whether a comment may be offensive to a particular group because these judges can 
provide a different lens to the situation based on their personal experiences with 
discrimination.118  Finally, during Judge Nguyen’s confirmation hearing in front of 
the Senate Judiciary Committee, she told members that “her life experience . . . gives 
[her] an appropriate sense of humility when [she] review[s] the facts of each case.  
[She] ha[s] an understanding and appreciation of how intimidating the court system 
 115.  Ifill, supra note 44. 
 116.  Confidential Interview with Ninth Circuit Judge, in San Francisco, Calif. (Oct. 17, 2017). 
 117.  Id.
 118.  Telephone Interview with Judge Consuelo M. Callahan, supra note 45. 
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can be.”119  She also highlighted that diversity is especially imperative at the circuit 
court level because the structure of panels creates a more improved “end product . . . 
as a result of that dialogue.”120
Finally, and most importantly, the interviews and cases both suggest that while 
racial diversity matters, the law matters more.  Although the judges articulated that 
racial diversity plays a significant role in the court’s reputation with the public, they 
consistently reiterated their duty to faithfully apply the law.  When addressing the 
value of diversity on the bench, Judge Nguyen expressed that it is “critically 
important” to have a judiciary that is reflective of the population that we serve.121
She explained that the Ninth Circuit’s credibility as a public institution depends on 
the trust that the public has in the judges’ decision-making.122  Thus, if a judiciary 
is comprised of all white men from corporate law firms, she explained, this would 
erode the public’s trust.123  This advantageous perspective is unique to diverse 
judges and exemplifies the circumstances, although limited, in which a diverse judge 
can incorporate his or her experiences into judicial decision-making.  It coincides 
with Judge Nguyen’s belief that “diversity is absolutely critical to the viability of the 
judiciary as an institution.”124  Conversely, even though judicial diversity is 
imperative to the credibility of the bench, the interviews and case law tend to prove 
that the law influences minority judges more than their experiences.  This is perhaps 
due to the tremendous obligation that diverse judges feel to implement the law 
impartially.125
B.  Limitations of the Study 
Although this study provides valuable insight on particular Ninth Circuit 
judges, it is limited in terms of its scope and message.  First, the Note’s focus is 
primarily on 11 federal judges on the Western coast of the United States in a circuit 
that has the reputation of being the most liberal.126  Likewise, the personal interviews 
consisted of an even smaller sample size of four judges.  These small sample sizes 
are not representative of the broad ideological composition and decision-making of 
all federal judges.  Thus, it is important to refrain from generalizing the findings of 
this study to all federal circuit courts or the federal judiciary in general. 
 119.  Kitty Felde, Southern California Judge Questioned by Senate Judiciary Committee, SO.
CAL. PUB. RADIO (Nov. 2, 2011), http://www.scpr.org/news/2011/11/02/29683/southern-californi 
a-judge-questioned-senate-judici/. 
 120.  Telephone Interview with Judge Jacqueline H. Nguyen, supra note 48. 
 121.  Id.
 122.  Id.
 123.  Id.
 124.  Id.
 125.  See generally CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES, supra note 59, at Canon 
2; 28 U.S. Code § 453 (1990). 
 126.  Gene Johnson, How ‘Liberal’ Reputation of 9th Circuit Court of Appeals is Overblown, 
Scholars Say, ORANGE COUNTY REG. (Feb. 6, 2017), http://www.ocregister.com/2017/02/06/how-
liberal-reputation-of-9th-circuit-court-of-appeals-is-overblown-scholars-say/. 
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Second, the study can be improved by crafting more open-ended questions for 
the interviews.  For example, some questions that I asked did not elicit substantial 
or extensive responses from the judges because some may have viewed any 
controversial implications as politically charged.  These included questions such as, 
“What role, if any, do you think your ethnic background plays in your decision 
making?” and “Do you perceive a difference between minority and nonminority 
judges in deciding equal protection cases?”  Therefore, the interview questions could 
have been developed in a manner that encouraged honest responses while still 
abiding by the judges’ ethical duties of fairness.127
Third, it is extremely difficult to control the factor of race in any study.  For 
example, a prior research study examining the effect of black counter judges 
illustrated the difficulty of isolating the factor of race because of how infrequent it 
was to have a panel of judges that is entirely black.128  Similarly here, despite the 
diversity of the Ninth Circuit bench compared to the other federal circuits, there have 
only been a few equal protection panels that consisted of all diverse judges.  In 
addition, it is difficult to discern whether a judge’s decision is driven by race alone, 
or a variety of different factors such as precedent, personal experience, or ideology. 
Fourth, the conferences of the Ninth Circuit panels are confidential.129
Therefore, it is difficult for a researcher to inquire into the robust discussions that 
the panel engages in prior to its decision.  This confidentiality is detrimental to 
researchers because some of the points made during personal interviews will not be 
easily seen in the case law.  Another limitation relating to confidentiality is the Ninth 
Circuit’s process of assigning cases.130  While the Ninth Circuit publicizes that they 
employ a method of random selection to assign cases,131 the specific procedure is 
largely left unknown to the American public.132  These restrictions make it 
challenging to thoroughly evaluate judges’ thought processes and the factors they 
take into consideration when evaluating an equal protection claim. 
Last, the main limitation with the personal interviews is the reality that the 
judges’ responses were most likely censored, even if unconsciously.  To address this 
limitation, I have sought to fill in the gaps by using case law, newspaper articles, 
and official statements to supplement the judges’ responses.  Because Ninth Circuit 
judges enjoy a prestigious position within the legal system, they may be more 
inclined to respond in a certain manner due to ethical and political considerations. 
 127.  See CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES, supra note 59, at Canon 2.  
 128.  Kastellec 2013, supra note 32 at 176; see also Kastellec 2011, supra note 32, at 377–391.  
 129.  Confidential Interview with Ninth Circuit Judge, in San Francisco, Calif. (Oct. 17, 2017). 
 130.  Ronald D. Rotunda, The Mystery of Case Assignment in the Ninth Circuit, JUSTIA (Dec. 
1, 2014), https://verdict.justia.com/2014/12/01/mystery-case-assignment-ninth-circuit. 
 131.  See generally 9TH CIR. APP. P. Circuit Advisory Committee Notes.   
 132.  Rotunda, supra note 130. 
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C.  Future Studies 
Judicial diversity is an exciting subject that could benefit from more research.  
While equal protection doctrine does encompass a wide variety of issues, future 
research can focus on other legal issues that may produce more conducive or 
different results.  For example, studies can investigate the impact of judicial diversity 
on intellectual property, torts, or first impression cases.  Another study can 
distinguish between the impact of diverse judges on state versus federal courts 
within the hierarchy of courts at the district, appellate, and Supreme Court levels. 
Additionally, future studies can discover the impact of minority Justices on the 
U.S. Supreme Court when more diverse Justices are appointed.  This dynamic may 
produce different results because of the larger group size of the panel, the prestigious 
status of the Justices, and the greater policy implications of their decisions.  In fact, 
The New York Times reported on this issue and wrote, “a Washington lawyer, 
cautioned against extrapolating to the Supreme Court from studies of appeals courts.  
‘Maybe one out of nine is different from one out of three.’”133  Therefore, an analysis 
of the U.S. Supreme Court may be more beneficial in discerning the impact of race 
because the Justices may be more willing to speak about their individual decision-
making due to the fact that they are not bound by the decisions of a higher court.  
This independence differs markedly from the constraints that appellate judges face, 
such as their responsibility in applying precedent from the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Conclusion
The current Administration has exhibited an indifference to the value that a 
diverse judiciary brings to a legitimate government structure.134  Because judicial 
diversity is not a priority on President Donald Trump’s political agenda, the number 
of racial minorities on the bench may decline.135  This detrimental shift against 
judicial diversity is evidenced in President Trump’s recent federal judicial nominees, 
which have been 91% White and 81% male.136  President Trump’s choice of 
nominees starkly contrasts President Barack Obama’s legacy of diversifying the 
courts, as President Obama “was the first President for whom nontraditional 
nominees comprised a majority (69%) of all those he appointed as circuit court 
 133.  Adam Liptak, The Waves Minority Judges Always Make, N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/31/weekinreview/31liptak.html.
 134.  See generally Carrie Johnson, One Year In, Trump Has Kept A Major Promise: 
Reshaping the Federal Judiciary, NPR (Jan. 21, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/01/21/5791697 
72/one-year-in-trump-has-kept-a-major-promise-reshaping-the-federal-judiciary.
 135.  Catherine Lucey & Meghan Hoyer, Trump Choosing White Men as Judges, Highest Rate 
in Decades, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 13, 2017), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/po 
litics/ct-trump-blacks-judges-20171113-story.html. 
 136.  Id.
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judges.”137  In contrast, President Trump’s nominees to the Ninth Circuit,138 along 
with his hostile perception of the federal circuit court,139 foreshadows a possible 
unfortunate decrease in judicial diversity in the coming years.
By demonstrating the invaluable contributions that judicial diversity brings to 
the judicial branch, this Note suggests that failing to diversify judicial appointments 
comes at a cost.  Although judicial diversity does not play a significant role in 
influencing equal protection doctrine, the value that minority judges bring to the 
federal judiciary should not be overlooked.  Minority judges exhibit a “heightened 
awareness” of the issues that disadvantaged people face.140  Due to this special 
perspective, diverse judges are more able to fully comprehend the impact of their 
decisions on the people they serve and give credence to a “color-blind” 
Constitution.141  As judges of color, they bring a greater quality to the Ninth Circuit 
that was absent for centuries.  Their ability to faithfully interpret the law, despite its 
tension with their closely-held personal beliefs, adds a vital layer of legitimacy and 
democracy to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 
 137.  Barry J. McMillion, U.S. Circuit and District Court Judges: Profile of Select 
Characteristics, CONG. RES. SERV., Summary (2017). 
 138.  Judicial Vacancies and Nominations, UNITED STATES COURTS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
(Aug. 21, 2018), https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/content/view_db.php?pk_id=0000000899.  
 139.  Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Jan. 10, 2018, 6:11 AM), https://t 
witter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/951094078661414912; id. at (Apr. 26, 2018, 3:20 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/857177434210304001; id. at (Apr. 26, 2018, 3:38 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/857182179469774848.  
 140.  Kastellec 2013, supra note 32.  
 141.  Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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